Monday, June 15, 2009

The Iranian Election Fraud and American Policy

It is not very often I intermingle my dueling interests in international relations and domestic policy making, but this week’s election farce in Iran begs to be put under the microscope for a few reasons.

First, to bring anyone up to speed who isn’t already there; An election was held in Iran on Saturday. Incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmedinijad won in a landslide, a landslide that should not have happened. Among hundreds of reports of irregularities at polling places, such as polls running out of paper, voters being turned away, and polls closing with long lines still outside, final vote tallies began pouring in hours early, and the returns showed Ahmedinijad winning re-election with 62.6% of the vote. His nearest rival, Hussein Moussavi, received only 34% of the vote, odd considering he was the odds on favorite to win only a week ago.

Moussavi, who campaigned on women’s rights and promised a more amenable relationship with the west, has denounced the election results as a fraud. People have taken to the streets in protest. The government has shut down access to cellular text messaging services, and internet networking sites such as twitter, and facebook.

Ayatollah Kahmenei, the real supreme leader in Iran, has closed the door on any possibility of a re-count, endorsing Ahmedinijad as the winner, and has asked the nation to unite behind the incumbent President. Ahmedinijad, for his part, has began threatening protesters for questioning the election results, and has even put reformist activists and moderate clerics under house arrest. The Interior Ministry, responsible for counting the votes, issued a statement that police were being stationed around their building, and if anyone approached, the police would have authority to open fire.

Reports from Iran seem to indicate that Tehran is quickly becoming a powder keg. Ahmedenijad may not be afraid of the protesters, but is afraid of Moussavi, and his political connections. Moussavi may even seek to try and dislodge Kahmenei as well as Ahmedinjaid.

For anyone who doesn’t quite understand just how volatile the situation is, look at these short videos:





These videos, along with dozens of pictures, have been put up on Revolutionary Road, a blog put together by an Iranian student calling for, you guessed it, a revolution. Things could get out of hand quickly there.

Meanwhile, back in DC, the Obama administration has been anxiously watching the results. Their hopes of dealing with a more moderate leader appear to be dashed, though they are being careful not to out and say that the election was completely fraudulent. Vice President Biden gave an interview on Meet the Press where he spoke about how skeptical the administration is of the election results.

The President proposed an openness policy in Dealing with America’s enemies during last year’s election. That proposed policy is part of the reason he won so much support from foreign policy analysts and intellectuals throughout 2008. But the Obama administration was anticipating a regime change in Iran when it began outlining that policy in January. Even if Ahmedinijad was replaced with another conservative puppet to be manipulated by the Ayatollah, he would have been easier to deal with than the inherently inflammatory Ahmedinijad. The administration will likely have to continue to seek a new line of dialogue with Iran, but it will be much more difficult now that Iran is in the game of flagrantly manipulating elections and arresting opposition.

In America, Obama’s openness policy will be an even tougher sell than it was before. Ahmedinijad gave tons of ammo to Obama’s critics, who will point to the election as even more evidence of anti-democratic principles taking hold in Tehran. While that may not stop the President from still dealing with Ahmedinijad (It’s not like the US doesn’t engage itself in talks with illegitimate dictatorships around the world on basically a daily basis or anything), it will make life more difficult for Obama at home.

Of course, the President’s recent speech in Cairo, Egypt makes things even more complicated than they were before. The picture presenting itself currently suggests that the people of the middle east are listening to Obama’s comments and can see the olive branch being extended from the US. But fundamentalists and dictators like the Ayatollah and Ahmedinijad, in firm control of state apparatus, continue to try and pull their state away. But it could potentially come to a head in Tehran. Actually, of all the people I’ve heard link the Cairo speech and the election in Iran together, Joe Scarburough of all people makes the most sense:

“You know, the law of unintended consequences came in again. I suspect that Cairo speech really scared the grand ayatollahs in Iran. If they were going to fix an election, this was a time to fix it, because the last thing they wanted to do was Barack Obama to take credit for reformers winning in Iran, like they already have in Lebanon. And, and by the way, in the short-term that's bad news for us. I think in the long-term, though, if ayatollahs are seen stealing an election as a result from what Barack Obama did in Cairo, I actually think that's a positive for the United States and Iran in the long run.”


The Reality Based Community states it best, “Barack Obama has consistently displayed one of the politician's supreme gifts: the capacity to induce his opponents to self-destruct.” With the Iranian government and religious leadership no longer even acknowledging the people’s voice in elections, the outpouring of frustration could quickly tear Iran apart. The conservatives, engaging in erratic economic policy, repressive domestic policy, and antagonistic foreign policy could easily be ousted in favor of the more moderate (though not necessarily progressive) opposition.

There are two possible outcomes; either the Ayatollah holds steadfast, Ahmedinijad puts down the opposition, and nothing changes, or the Ayatollah is forced to give in, Ahmedinijad is forced from office or even arrested. Both scenarios have dramatically different effects on American foreign policy with regards to Iran, and even with regard to Iraq and Israel. But we may not know what will happen for weeks.